This issue of intent vs. action, how much intent is required or needs to be demonstrated, and what type of (even limited) action can make ones liable for intent, what would we legally consider an attempt, and a variety of such related issues – came up a few times (especially later) in my Summer 2025 Grand Jury experience, and it recalled for me both the Talmudic discussion and the Chassidic paradoxical emphasis on these issues.
It’s a fascinating topic, because Judaism is very interested both in intent and in action. There’s much Talmud and Halacha on the interplay of intent and action. The Alter Rebbe in Tanya emphasizes and extols both (albeit in different ways) in terms of fulfillment of a mitzvah (to the extent that Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm considers Alter Rebbe to be ambivalent on this – but those who learn Chassidus and Rebbe’s sichos see how all this is reconciled).
In terms of NYS Law, intent is only relevant once a person does something to act upon that intent – and in some cases can be liable even if the intent was not actualized. Sometimes all that actualization is the travel towards doing that criminal act – even if the act was not done. But the criminal intent was acted upon. And this, too, is reflected in certain Talmudic rulings, which makes it all the more fascinating.
But Talmudic Law and American Law alike, both insist that intent alone does not fulfill the mitzvah (or negative act). One is only liable for action. Sometimes the action may be a small move or a mere expression of the intent, but one must act on it for it to be legally liable or for the act to be considered an attempt.